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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : APPELLANTS BRIEF 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, : Case No. 950261-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Defendants/Respondents. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Kenneth Wayne Monders, by and through counsel, James 
C. Lewis and George S. Diumenti II, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby 
submits the following BRIEF: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this appeal is properly before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The Supreme Court 
has assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4A of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and that transfer dated April 26, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) Whether the Trial Court erred in granting to plaintiff the Outlaw Saloon and related 
building and real property, when there was no evidence regarding the value of the business, and 
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it is clear on the record that plaintiff stated in no uncertain terms in discovery responses, that she 
intended to sell the Outlaw Saloon and related real estate. 
2) Whether the Trial Court erred by failing to order a sale of the Outlaw Saloon and real 
property, in view of plaintiffs statement that she intended to sell such real property, and her 
failure to subsequently supplement her responses to discovery. 
3) Whether the Trial Court erred in finding a value for the Outlaw Saloon of $155,000, 
when no evidence was presented by the parties as to the value of the business. 
4) Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to recognize substantial contributions to the 
Outlaw Saloon by defendant, by awarding defendant less than only one-fourth of the Outlaw 
Saloon and related real estate - a marital asset. 
5) Whether the Trial Court erred in granting to plaintiff, free of any claim by 
defendant, all of the rights, claims, choses in action, to an option to purchase a parcel of real 
property, when the option was held by both parties, and the evidence at trial was uncontroverted 
that (a) the option had substantial value; (b) the property under the option had substantial value 
exceeding the option price; and (c) plaintiff had no intention of exercising the option. 
The standard of review with regard to the issues enumerated above, is a correction of 
error standard. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
OR RULES 
(see Addendum for verbatim test) 
1. Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE; COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce proceeding between Plaintiff Cheryl Monders (hereinafter referred to as 
"plaintiff"), and Defendant Kenneth Wayne Monders (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant" 
or "appellant"). Defendant appeals from the judgment, order and decree in the District Court, 
regarding issues of property division. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court 
This matter was tried to the lower court on January 3, 1995, whereupon the trial court 
granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The sole 
issues presented at trial were the division of property and assets of the marriage, and neither party 
sought, nor did the trial court consider, alimony. On or about January 5, 1995, the trial court 
issued a memorandum decision whereby the parties' principal marital assets, a business known 
as the Outlaw Saloon, and related real estate, were awarded to plaintiff, subject to an obligation 
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in favor of defendant. On or about January 25, 1995, proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and a decree of divorce, were submitted to the court by plaintiff. On or about February 7, 
1995, defendant submitted specific objections to plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law. On or about February 17, 1995, the trial court entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, in the form submitted by plaintiff. Notice of appeal 
was filed March 20, 1995. 
H. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This action involves proceedings for a divorce and other relief pertinent to such action 
sought in the lower court by the parties. The parties were married on April 25, 1987, in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, and were husband and wife until the entry of the decree of divorce. The divorce 
complaint in this matter was filed in January, 1994. There were no children from the marriage. 
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was employed at a motel and restaurant in Moab, 
Utah. A few months prior to the marriage in November, 1986, plaintiff, with the assistance of 
defendant, opened a bar known as the "Outlaw Saloon", which was located in a leased space in 
Moab, Utah. (T.R. 92 and 143-144). The Outlaw Saloon had been opened through the joint 
efforts of the parties, but prior to the marriage of the parties (Transcript Record at 211, lines 9 -
16; 232, line 13, to 233, line 13.) 
From the date of establishment of the Outlaw Saloon, defendant worked in the business 
and represented himself to be a co-owner of the saloon. (T.R. 50-51,145-146). From the time 
of establishment of the saloon, defendant believed the parties had a verbal understanding that they 
would be partners in the business. (T.R. 234 - 235; 254, lines 9-24). Plaintiff had invested 
approximately twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) of her money into the establishment of the 
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saloon operation. Despite contributing most of his time in 1987 and 1988 to the Outlaw Saloon 
business, defendant was not paid for his efforts on behalf of the business. (T.R. 57, line 22; 158, 
lines 2-11; 236, lines 16-23; 250, line 2-19). Defendant contributed his time to the business 
from 1988 to 1990, for which defendant received very little compensation. (T.R. 249-252, line 
2). Plaintiff, who was working full time at another job, did not work in the saloon for the first 
three years (T.R. 211, lines 17-24), and acted as the person responsible for bookkeeping, payroll 
and financial matters relating to the business (T.R. at 48, lines 3-4, 154-155). 
Defendant worked in the Outlaw Saloon from the day it opened until it changed location 
in 1991, except for a brief period of approximately 3 months in which he attempted to start 
another business (during which time he worked for the business part time). (T.R. 236, line 24, 
to 237, line 10). He continued to work in the bar until the parties separated in November, 1993 
(T.R. 250, line 2, to 252, line 2). 
In the latter part of 1990, the parties became aware that the Outlaw Saloon had to be 
relocated, and they began looking for a new location for the saloon. (T.R. 157, lines 4-10; 239, 
line 10, to 240, line 9). In October, 1990, the parties found a parcel of real property, including 
a building, owned by plaintiffs uncle, and entered into a purchase contract for the purchase of 
this real property, for the sum of $80,000, of which $23,000 was paid at the time of entering into 
the contract, and the balance of $57,000 was financed at the rate of 10% per annum, payable over 
ten years. The down payment was paid by plaintiff. (T.R. 103-107; 239-240; and Exhibit P -
13). On the same day as the purchase contract, the seller also granted to plaintiff and defendant 
a written option to purchase the lot adjacent to the real property under the purchase contract, for 
the sum of $10,000, exercisable within one year. (T.R. 107, and Exhibit P-15). At the time 
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of the purchase agreement, plaintiff was aware that the building on the lot which was being 
purchased encroached onto the lot under option. (T.R. 106, lines 17-24; 158, line 20 to 159, line 
7). 
After entering into the purchase agreement, the parties worked together to remodel and 
make improvements to the existing building to establish and operate the Outlaw Saloon at this 
new location. The parties opened the Outlaw Saloon at the new location together (T.R. 150, lines 
13-15). The Outlaw Saloon ceased operations at its original location in approximately August, 
1991, and reopened at its new location in the latter part of 1991. (T.R. 100). 
In 1988, after the original Outlaw Saloon was opened, plaintiff created a corporation to 
own and operate the Outlaw Saloon. Although defendant was an officer and director of the 
corporation until after the parties separated, plaintiff effectively removed plaintiff from all 
management actions, and issued all of the outstanding stock of the corporation to herself. 
Plaintiff operated the corporation without holding valid board of directors meetings, and in 
disregard of required corporate formalities. (T.R. 188-190, 192-193; 238, line 14, to 239, line 
9; and Exhibits P-21 and P-22). 
In October, 1991, when the option to purchase the adjoining lot was due to expire, 
plaintiff attempted to exercise the option. Seller, plaintiffs uncle, refused to accept the tender 
by plaintiff. In October, 1993, plaintiffs counsel sent to plaintiffs uncle a letter, asserting 
plaintiffs compliance in exercising the option, and plaintiffs intention to take legal action if 
necessary. (T.R. 159, lines 24, to 160, line 8 and Exhibit D-21). Despite her knowledge that 
a portion of the Outlaw Saloon, and part of the parking lot of the Outlaw Saloon, sits on the 
adjacent lot which was under option, plaintiff indicated at tnal and in responses to discovery that 
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she did not intend to further pursue enforcement of the option agreed upon or the purchase of 
the adjacent lot. (T.R. 167, lines 10-11, 212, lines 3-7, and Exhibit D-24, response to Request 
for Admission Number 1; and Exhibit D-25, response to interrogatory Nos. 19 and 23). 
Plaintiff is presently under a month to month rental arrangement for the use of the adjacent 
property, but has no written agreement with her uncle (T.R. I l l , lines 4-9), except the option 
described above. 
On March 2, 1992, the parties signed an agreement which contemplated the joint 
ownership and operation of the Outlaw Saloon, and the reimbursement by defendant to plaintiff 
of $30,000, or one-half of the amount ($60,000) it was estimated plaintiff had invested in the 
business. (T.R. 129-131,151-152). This agreement also divided responsibility for the operation 
of the bar, set salaries for plaintiff and defendant, and outlined a means for preserving the marital 
union. Neither party complied with the terms of the agreement. The trial court found that this 
agreement was not useful as a legal document because it was breached by both parties, and 
because agreements between parties to a marriage are usually not binding. However, the trial 
court found that the agreement was helpful as an expression of the states of mind of the parties 
prior to divorce proceedings, and as an expression by both parties that the Outlaw Saloon was 
a joint marital venture, and that plaintiff had a substantial investment in the venture. Despite its 
finding that the evidence demonstrated, contrary to plaintiffs assertions, that the Outlaw Saloon 
and related real property was a marital asset, the trial court determined that plaintiff was entitled 
to three fourths of the assets, after deductions of amounts invested by plaintiff. (See 
Memorandum Decision dated January 5, 1995, pp 4-5, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, par. 21-22). 
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At the trial, plaintiff presented evidence from Joe David Kingsley, a real estate agent in 
the Moab area, regarding the value of the real estate which is the location of the Outlaw Saloon. 
(T.R. 20). On cross-examination, Mr. Kingsley expressly stated that his opinions did not take 
into account a going concern valuation of the business; that he did not know what the Outlaw 
Saloon business would "fetch in the market", and that he had inadequate information to form an 
opinion regarding the value of the business. (T.R. 22 and 29). In its findings, the trial court 
states that plaintiffs "evidence about the value of the Outlaw Saloon was not countered by 
evidence from [defendant]", and that "[plaintiffs] expert opined that the total value of the 
business and the real estate on which it is located is $155,000". (See Memorandum Decisions 
dated January 25, 1995, p. 5, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, par. 23). However, 
no evidence was presented by either party regarding the value of the business. In fact, on cross-
examination, plaintiff could not answer numerous basic questions regarding the financial 
statements for the Outlaw Saloon, prepared by plaintiffs accountant at plaintiffs direction. (T.R. 
195-199). As indicated below, defendant did not present evidence regarding the value of the 
business, due to plaintiffs responses to discovery in which she indicated that she intended to sell 
the business. (T.R. 203, line 9, to 205, line 7; and discussion on the record, 205, line 11, to 210, 
line 25; and Exhibits D-24 and D-25). 
On cross-examination, Joe Kingsley stated that the property subject to the option 
agreement had a value of "around $25,000", or substantially in excess of the $10,000 exercise 
price of the lot, and that such lot would be worth even more if owned or purchased by the owner 
of the adjoining lot (where the Outlaw Saloon was located). (T.R. 35 and 39-40). 
On cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that in responses to interrogatories and 
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requests for admission propounded by defendant, dated November 29,1994, or slightly more than 
one month before the trial in this matter (and one day before a previously scheduled trial), she 
had stated that she intended to sell the business. Plaintiff further acknowledged that she 
subsequently changed her mind regarding her intent to sell the business. (T.R. 204-205). 
In Defendant's Exhibit 24, in response to a request for admission (Number 1), plaintiff 
admits that she is "willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon for the sum of ONE 
HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000), payable in cash payable within 
sixty (60) days of the earnest money agreement provided that the person purchasing the property 
is willing to assume all title defects associated with the property, and further assuming that the 
plaintiff will not be required to pay any real estate commissions, costs of sale beyond title 
insurance and recording fees and will have to pay no costs for purposes of clearing title to any 
portion of this sale property." Similarly, in response to a second set of discovery propounded 
by defendant, Exhibit D-25, interrogatory number 19, also dated November 29, 1994, plaintiff 
stated that she has "told a thousand people that this business [the Outlaw Saloon] will be for sale 
upon the completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and telephone numbers is too lengthy 
to list at this time." Finally, in response to interrogatory Number 23 of such discovery 
propounded by defendant (Exhibit D-25), plaintiff states that she is "willing to sell the business 
known as the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., of which I am the 100% stockholder and president together 
with the real property on which it is located . . . " As indicated, these discovery responses were 
received on or about November 29,1994, or approximately one month prior to the trial date, and 
three days prior to an earlier scheduled trial date on December 2, 1994, which was continued at 
the time the parties appeared the day of the trial. The record is clear - no effort was undertaken 
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by plaintiff to supplement this discovery to notify defendant of her change of mind regarding the 
sale of the business. (See discussions at trial, pages 205-210). 
As a result of plaintiffs discovery responses, and her subsequent failure to supplement 
such discovery, defendant did not put on any evidence at trial regarding the value of the business 
(nor did plaintiff); because it appeared clear that it was the desire of both parties to sell the 
business. (T.R. 205-210). 
In its findings, the trial court found that the real property and business was a marital asset, 
and that although the "usual presumption is that marital property should be divided equally after 
pre-marital contributions are returned", plaintiff should be awarded three fourths of the value of 
the marital assets. This determination was based on the trial court's conclusion that (a) plaintiff 
was in greater need of the marital assets, and (b) "most of the appreciation of the business and 
property is due to an overall increase in Moab property values and not to any efforts of either 
party to make the business a success". Based on these findings, the trial court awarded plaintiff 
the real property and business, subject only to an obligation in favor of defendant in the amount 
of $13,000, equal to one-fourth of the net value of these assets of $112,000, as determined by 
the trial court, after deducting the sum of $60,000, or the amount the trial court determined 
plaintiff had contributed to the business from pre-marital assets. The trial court determined that 
this obligation to defendant in the amount of $13,000 (together with an additional obligation from 
a marital asset in the amount of $5,500 which is not pertinent to this appeal), would be payable 
to defendant over a period of 8 years, with interest at the rate of seven (7%) per annum, in 
monthly payments of $250, commencing on February 1, 1995. (See Memorandum Decision 
dated January 5,1995, pages 6-7, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 25-
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29). The trial court additionally found that the parties claim to the adjacent lot under the option 
agreement, "has little or no value", and awarded the claim to the lot to plaintiff. (See 
Memorandum Decision, page 6, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 24). 
On approximately February 7, 1995, defendant submitted specific objections to the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, submitted to the trial court by plaintiff. On 
approximately February 17,1995, without further proceedings, hearing on defendant's objections 
or notice to the parties, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree 
of divorce in the form, or substantially the form, submitted by plaintiff. 
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff had a substantial amount of pre-marital assets, 
including approximately $20,000 invested in the Outlaw Saloon, $9,90 in currency, $15,524 in 
a savings account, $9,000 in an individual retirement account, motel stock worth $11,445, 
$10,000 in a tax-exempt bond, and miscellaneous assets. (T.R. 68-91; 97-99; and Exhibits P-4 
through P-9). Defendant brought no significant assets to the marriage. (T.R. 264-265). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In awarding the real property, business and related option rights to plaintiff, subject only 
to a small obligation in favor of defendant, the trial court erred and abused its discretion in a 
number of respects. First, the trial court's award of these marital assets to plaintiff was blatantly 
inconsistent with plaintiffs answers to defendant's discovery, received by defendant shortly before 
trial, in which she indicated her clear intent to sell the business and real estate, which answers 
she did not supplement timely before trial as required, thereby prejudicing defendant. Second, 
these marital assets were awarded to plaintiff, subject to a small obligation to defendant, despite 
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no evidence at trial regarding the value of the business. Third, in awarding to defendant one-
fourth of what the trial court determined to be the net equity of the marital assets, payable over 
8 years, the trial court did not properly consider the substantial contributions made by defendant 
to the business. Finally, the trial court erred in awarding to plaintiff the option rights to an 
adjacent parcel of property, a potentially valuable marital asset which defendant wanted and 
which plaintiff stated she had no intention to exercise. 
ARGUMENT 
I-II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
AS A SANCTION FOR FAILURE TO COOPERATE FULLY IN DISCOVERY 
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with 
a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to 
include information thereafter acquired, except as follows: (2)(B) he knows that the 
response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that 
a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
It is uncontroverted that plaintiff, in answers to defendant's discovery which were received 
by defendant just over one month prior to the trial in this matter (and 2-3 days prior to an earlier 
scheduled trial), plaintiff stated in no uncertain terms that it was her intention to sell the Outlaw 
Saloon and the real estate on which it is located. (T.R. 204-205; Exhibit D-24, response to 
request for admission number 1; Exhibit D-25, response to interrogatory numbers 23 and 24). 
Knowing full well that defendant would rely on this information in preparing for trial, plaintiff 
intentionally failed to appropriately supplement her discovery, but, instead, chose to surprise 
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defendant at trial by indicating that she had changed her mind and now wanted to own and 
operate the business. (T.R. 204-205, 136-138). 
Pursuant to URCP 37 any number of sanctions were available to the Judge to deal with 
this bad faith failure to amend. 
Clearly defendant was seriously prejudiced by the deception of plaintiff when she failed 
to seasonably supplement her discovery. It was uncontroverted that she had indicated her desire 
to sell the business, as noted above, and therefore defendant had every right to rely on this 
representation by not providing evidence on the value of the property and business. Obviously, 
the best measure of value of a business and real estate is what a seller can obtain in a sale in the 
market. Since defendant believed, justifiably, that both parties wanted to sell the business, it was 
only logical to assume that the best way to optimize the value of the assets, is to put them on 
the market - the relief sought by defendant, which was what plaintiff clearly indicated was her 
intent prior to the day of trial. By "springing" this evidence on defendant at trial, plaintiff denied 
defendant the opportunity to present evidence regarding the value of the business and the real 
estate - the single largest issue in this cause. 
The judge compounded this bad faith by making findings based on incomplete evidence 
of value, which requires reversal and a new hearing to determine the full correct value of the 
asset. It is fundamentally inequitable to allow plaintiff to deceive defendant with improper 
discovery responses, with no appropriate supplementation, and then further allow the judge to 
effectively ratify this behavior by making findings based on it, all of which was made clear in 
defendant's objections to the order (See T.R. 205-210, and Defendant's Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law). Furthermore, it would appear that case law would 
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make it incumbent on the trial court to either (a) sanction plaintiff for her improper actions, 
rather than rewarding her by ratifying them, or (b) require the presentation of additional evidence 
regarding the value of the business. 
In the case of Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that if the trial court found contempt on the part of a party, it was required to sanction said party, 
or provide a finding explaining the failure to do so. Although defendant herein argued for 
sanctions, or an order of sale of the property, no sanctions were made, the court did not 
implement a remedial approach which would have the effect of correcting the prejudice to 
defendant, nor did it offer and explanation for its decision to reward defendant for her flagrant 
failure to comply with discovery rules. 
If defendant had any clue that the judge would use such tainted evidence in his findings, 
certainly a continuance would have been sought in order to address the problem. Since defendant 
could not have anticipated that the judge would use such highly prejudicial and improper 
evidence, he had no reason to seek a continuance, especially given the continued request to the 
court that the property be ordered sold according to plaintiffs oft-repeated desires. On this 
ground alone the case must be remanded for further evidence of valuation, or an order of sale, 
see e.g., Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). In said case the Supreme Court remarked at 
length about the ambiguities and lack of clarity in the finding of the court regarding the value 
of various properties, and stated: "In view of this evidence a more thorough hearing which fully 
explores the value of the business and the income generating capabilities of the Reads is 
warranted.", and remanded. Id at 873. 
A recent case from this court addresses this issue, Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 
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(Utah App. 1988). In Naranjo, it was noted that a trial court's decree is entitled to a presumption 
of validity but: "Changes will be made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Id. at 1146. Defendant submits to the court that there was an open and obvious misapplication 
of the law herein, that not only did the evidence preponderate against the findings, but the 
findings were based upon no evidence whatsoever, and that an extremely serious inequity has 
resulted, given that the effect of the award is that defendant worked for several years as a partner 
in a venture for which he now gets very little. This court should review the facts and make its 
own judgment, pursuant to the holding of Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977 (Utah 1956), wherein 
the court held "[A] divorce proceeding is equitable and that it is within the prerogative of this 
court to review the evidence and to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under proper 
circumstances." IdL at 981. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VALUE FOR THE OUTLAW SALOON 
The trial court awarded to plaintiff the Outlaw Saloon and real estate, despite the fact that 
there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the value of the business. In its Memorandum 
Decision dated January 5, 1995, the Court states on page 5 that "[plaintiffs] evidence about the 
value of the Outlaw Saloon was not countered by evidence from [defendant]" and "[plaintiffs] 
expert opined that the total value of the business and the real estate on which it is operated is 
$155,000". In reality, plaintiffs expert made it clear that he did not have an opinion regarding 
the value of the business. (T.R. 22 and 29), nor was any other evidence as to the business's value 
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presented by either party. As indicated above, the defendant had no reason to present evidence 
regarding the value of the business, because he prepared for trial with the clear impression, based 
on plaintiffs discovery responses, that both parties wanted to sell the business and real estate. 
The bulk of the argument from section M I also addresses this issue. Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that a trial court needs a clear record upon which to base its 
findings. 
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), a case was remanded back to 
the trial court because the Supreme Court held: "On the present record, we cannot determine 
whether the trial court distributed the property equitably. To avoid problems of this nature, we 
require that when one of the parties to a property distribution raises a serious question as to the 
value of one...of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon 
written findings of fact that will permit appellate review." Id. at 1074 (citations omitted). 
Obviously, in the instant case the foundation of the trial court's findings of value are laid 
upon no evidence whatsoever, and therefore, even though there are written findings, they are not 
of a nature or quality that permits review, nor are they calculated to allow the appellate court to 
determine their equity or lack thereof. Therefore, this case should be remanded for further 
findings regarding valuation of the business. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DEFENDANT 
It was uncontroverted at trial that from 1987 through the date of separation of the parties 
16 
in the end of 1993, defendant devoted a substantial portion of his time to the business. 
Defendant was not paid for his services on behalf of the business in 1987 and 1988, and paid a 
paltry sum thereafter. (T.R. 57, 158, 236, 250). Despite his substantial contribution of time to 
the business, defendant was awarded what the court determined to be one-fourth of the net asset 
value of the business and marital property, payable over 8 years! This is clearly inequitable 
given the relative contributions of the parties. 
As indicated, it was uncontroverted at trial that defendant had spent a very substantial 
portion of the marriage working full-time or nearly so for the benefit of the Outlaw Saloon; he 
devoted over six years to this enterprise. It was further uncontroverted that he received next to 
nothing as remuneration for this work. This is a classic example of "sweat equity," and its value 
is recognized by Utah courts, see e.g., the Preston case discussed above. 
The trial court's determination that plaintiff should receive the great majority of the 
marital assets, and the benefit of the business and real estate (despite an absence of valuation of 
the business and plaintiffs stated intention to sell the business), was based on its conclusions that: 
(a) plaintiff was older and in greater need of the assets; and (b) most of the appreciation of the 
in the "value of the business" was due to an overall increase in Moab property values". (See 
Memorandum Decision, page 6). These conclusions were clearly not supported by the evidence. 
First, while its was established that defendant had no assets, it was equally clear that plaintiff had 
substantial other assets to support herself. Secondly, as indicated throughout this brief, there was 
no evidence to support the valuation regarding the business, upon which the trial court could 
conclude that the appreciation of such value is attributable to appreciation in Moab property 
values. Thirdly, the trial court had no reason to conclude (if it did conclude; the findings are not 
17 
clear) that defendant contributed any less, through his efforts, than plaintiff in maintaining the 
business, in order that it could appreciate. 
In considering and fashioning equitable property division in a divorce, trial courts need 
to consider all pertinent circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). The factors 
a trial court should consider in dividing property in a divorce are such things as the amount and 
kind of property to be divided, whether property was acquired before or during marriage, the 
sorts of property, health of the parties, respective standards of living and financial conditions, 
needs, earning capacity, duration of marriage, children of marriage, parties ages at time of 
marriage and divorce, what the parties gave up by the marriage, whether one or both spouses has 
made a contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the 
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. IcL at 135. 
In the instant case, while the trial court appeared to consider these factors as they applied 
to plaintiff, it also appeared to disregard these factors in respect to the defendant. Defendant 
made substantial contributions to the business, which enabled the parties to maintain ownership 
of the property and realize the "appreciation in value" to which the trial court appears to give 
plaintiff full credit. Defendant devoted six years to the enterprise, and is now in a far worse 
financial position than plaintiff. This result is inequitable. 
In reversing an inequitable marital asset division, this court recently held: "The overriding 
consideration in property division is that the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly 
divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances 
at the time of the divorce. On remand, the trial court should follow the systematic approach set 
forth in Burt. That is, the court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of 
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the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other as set forth in this opinion. Each 
is then presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the 
marital property, absent special circumstances property accumulated by the parties during the 
marriage should be equally divided. We find that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property based solely on the parties' 
economic contributions to the marriage...", Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) at 
1322-3, (citations omitted). 
The trial court herein seriously violated the spirit and intent of the Dunn decision. Equity 
absolutely demands that this case be remanded for further findings based on real evidence. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALL OF THE OPTIONED LAND 
RIGHTS TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff and defendant had a very valuable option right to property adjacent to the saloon. 
Although under the contract the option price was $10,000, evidence at trial was that the land was 
worth at least $25,000, and considerably more to the parties since it was contiguous to their 
business. (T.R. 35, 39-40). Further, plaintiff testified that she had no intention to pursue the 
option. (T.R. 167). Nevertheless, and despite a request that the option rights be granted to 
defendant, the trial court awarded plaintiff the entire option to plaintiff, depriving defendant of 
a valuable property right. 
Plaintiff will argue that the award of the option to plaintiff is appropriate because, as the 
trial court indicated, it has little value. However, the evidence introduced at trial is contrary to 
that conclusion. In a letter from plaintiffs counsel to the owner of the property under option (D-
21) long after the expiration date, plaintiff claims that she tendered payment under the option 
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timely, and asserts all of her rights (interestingly, not defendant's, who was a party to the option), 
under the option. 
This distribution is, on its face, inequitable, and becomes even more so when the valuation 
of the underlying business is taken into account. As will be noted below in the analysis of the 
Naranjo case, supra, such inequity demands that the judgment be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully seeks an order of the Court reversing the trial court's division of 
the marital assets, awarding the Outlaw Saloon and related real property and property rights to 
the parties equally and ordering a sale of such property, or, alternatively, that this matter be 
remanded to the trial court for further findings regarding the value of the business and an equal 
division of the marital assets based on such valuation. 
Respectfully submitted this u^ day of September, 1995. 
les Cr Lewis 
'DIUMENTI &4LEWIS 
^05 SQXIXHi^lAIN STREET 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Cnei
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marriage, those benefits continued and were extended to J.W. A 
few months before the marriage, J.W. began working in the bar, 
terminating his minimum wage employment as a custodian for 
another motel. From that point forward, J.W. worked regularly in 
the bar, except for three months when he attempted to start a 
business for himself, until the parties separated in November, 
1993. Cheryl managed and worked in the bar during the same 
period of time. 
In late 199 0, Cheryl became aware that the motel and 
restaurant where she worked would be torn down. Construction of 
a new motel would require use of the space where she operated her 
bar. She therefore began looking for another location. On 
October 2, 199 0, she contracted to purchase a new lot with a 
building from her uncle for $23,000 down and a balance of $57,000 
at ten percent per annum over ten years. J.W. was a party to the 
contract, but furnished none of the down payment. The down 
payment came from pre-marital and inherited property of Cheryl. 
On this same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an 
option to purchase the adjacent lot for $10,000. The option was 
to be exercised within one year. 
Cheryl then began to remodel and improve the existing 
building to create a place to operate her bar. All of the 
remodeling funds came from Cheryl's premarital or inherited 
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property.1 ause Chery" :i-~< : ncorporated the ban I n 1938, she 
loaned the remodeling funds • -— —- r~ r- *-v- . utidv/ 
-.:-oon ceased operation a, o.^ _ .^^^.a. - ation ;.. August, : »91, 
and i *v; new r. J • opened in \:tober, 1991. 
Che- ."' - " * ; . 
corporation. ,iov.evei , n ^ ^J^J. corporate lax iciain i^sts 
stockholder loans to the corporation of onlv $25,500 as oi the 
end c :t: est - i 
i n v e s t m e n t . nery i hat, siiuwii t j iat s h e &u.^ ne r mote J s t o c x m 
1991, presumablv t o n n a n c p • n* remode 1 inn e f f o r t . 
- - ^ 
and corporate tax reiuuib . ^ r 1^89-92. Every tax ret showed 
Cheryl as the sol e proprietor- of « h*. r-- ^ ^ r o ** 
II I I III! Il II II , s l i d t I ' 1 1 1 l I i l l I I I  I I I I " 
corporation n jucjh ,"W, served as a director a no nominal 
secretary, 
r , 
J W During trie course cr * »• marriage, / » *s meals, lodging, 
insurance -in" transportation no^ds were provided as a condition 
< " , . . .. \.he operation of 
i.ne ousiness. J,- received no separate compensation until 1989 
ior ^ s w o r } C |.n the business. 
1
 Cheryl inherited $16,600 cash from her father in 1988 and $3,316 cash plus a right to 
$183 per month for seven years from, her mother in 1991. 
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On October 2, 1991, when the option for the adjacent 
lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the option and 
contacted her uncle for that purpose. Her uncle rejected her 
tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put 
their money into a home. The record reflects no further effort 
to acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993, when Cheryl's 
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade 
him to go through with the sale. That effort failed and Cheryl 
decided to abandon the effort. A portion of the saloon building 
actually sits on the adjacent lot and the parking lot is located 
in part on that parcel. Cheryl presently pays her uncle $100 per 
month for the right to occupy that property, but has no written 
agreement with him. 
After their separation in November, 1993, the parties 
entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the living 
quarters there. At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed and 
was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W. 
On March 2, 1992, Cheryl at J.W. signed an agreement. 
That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the business at 
$60,000 and provided that J.W. would reimburse her for half of 
that, or $30,000. The agreement also divided responsibility for 
operation of the bar, set salaries for Cheryl and J.W., and 
outlined a means for preserving the marital union. J.W. did not 
make more than the first few payments under this agreement, and 
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did n )t sell h ..- trailer and pay over the proceeds as he had 
ci - : * * • , ureach as a natural consequence of the 
iaixuie ,.: ....*- corporation to pay the salary provided b \ne 
agreement. 
n 
because -'*• . ^ u; eached L-: * • : u ^ a u i e s . Agreements jjetween ihe 
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equitable division will require that Cheryl receive more than 
one-half of thi s marital asset. 
Cheryl's evidence abou. L^-.. V~^.- : t:*.. _.*w*^ » Saloon 
was not countered by evidence frou *.w. /-.eryl's expert opined 
that *.he t~*-^  . valuo --* the business and tn» ~e~l estate on which 
i . operateu ^L
 T__, . . t accepts Lhis value. 
Cheryl and sti.. , <: uncle $43,00; tor the lot. 
Althc ^ 1 
2
 Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah, but only under 
conditions that this agreement made no effort, to meet. 
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chance of legal compelling the uncle to consummate the sale of 
the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their 
failure to pursue their claim. Because Cheryl has the best 
chance of being able to deal with her uncle for that adjacent 
lot, the Court believes it is most appropriate that the business, 
the real estate, and the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be 
awarded to Cheryl. 
The Court finds that the net value of all of these 
assets is $112,000. Cheryl had invested $60,000 of her separate 
pre-marital or inherited property in the business as of March, 
1992. She is entitled to recover all of that investment. The 
remaining value must be equitably divided between Cheryl and J.W. 
The usual presumption is that marital property should 
be divided equally after premarital contributions are returned. 
However, there are two facts that suggest the need for a 
different division in this case: 
1. Cheryl is 51 years old. J.W. is 38 years old. 
Cheryl has also suffered an injury to her leg that seriously 
limits her ability to work. She has a greater need for marital 
assets. 
2. Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the value 
of the business is due to an overall increase in Moab property 
values, not to any efforts of either party to make the business a 
success. In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are not a "growth 
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industry" ' ^r ;1 today• The bar is worth nore mainly because 
the j-cmv-t • ^ hi'"H * +~ sit^ h^c become more valuable 
$13,on to oncedes tnat tnere ir no other marital 
asset, except ^ ^ pert i or ~* r*u~-*-. • - * « *-rr^ r"! if ^d i':r,nrr 
the marri :-. -n^ry- .c;.u. .Jjuteu , 
marri * .ose contributions have accumulated interest ar. an 
average n f ~ cf r«?r--rt rrr r^r-;~ *"~ ~ "• average -* ^our 
years - ,
 v v. ., /a J.UL-LJ tr***- iiai *IJJ. J- %_ *. _ ^». . * . ...«, ^  c 
$11,0C0. One-half of this amount should be awarded t * 
the rate ^i. ^  . , pei^ t-iiv pf i Qii Uiu ix. Kji\i uciiiuary ay 
be pa : 1 bv C\VJ\ at the rate of $ 2 ^ ru : :. tn, beginning 
Febn iar} 
shall istaut:, ii. • rr • receive a Lien wi: the i w i estate 
under the bar ne amount- cr the property award. 
bear his J« costs o: , attorneys fees. Counsel for plaintifr ~i 
directed to prepare appropriate findings, conclusions and a 
decree 
DATED this 5th day of January, 1995. 
Lyle R, Anderson, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January 5, 1995, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Joane Pappas White James C. Lewis 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 DIUMENTI & LEWIS 
475 East Main 505 South Main 
Price, UT 84501 Bountiful, UT 84010 
FINDINGS OI FAL> 
6L CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
' ' ^ ' G I M A f 
Attorney Defe:..._ 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84S~1 
Telephone: (tu : 
SEVENTH DISTRICT'COURT 
Grand County 
CL£^f\ ^ r : n c u u u r 1 
"r:;r" S- V i N T h UlbTKlLi" UUUrCi IN AND I:: OR 
• -NTH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL WONDERS, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V s . 
KENNETH
 W A Y N E MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDIN 
CONCI AW 
Civil No. 9447-8 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
LYLE vNDERSON, District Court Judae, presiding. Plaintiff was 
pex . * . . . • 
WHIT* Defendant was personally present and accompanied . 
aL v JAML " l '"I it" ,ei *«> M 1 si M u J 
exhibits and _~.e matter under advisement, H a v m c teen fully 
advised i n the premises II i i.n I issued a MemoraiiL •_ - -
now, finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide resident 
of Grand County, State of Utah, and had been for more than three 
(3) months immediately next prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
2. The parties hereto were married on the 25th day of 
April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark County, State of Nevada and have 
been husband and wife since that date. 
3. The parties hereto separated on or about November, 
1993 and have lived separate and apart since that time. 
4 . The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
developed between the parties which makes it impossible for them to 
maintain a marital relationship and, therefore, the Plaintiff 
should be granted a Decree of Divorce terminating her marriage to 
the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
5. There have been no children born as the issue of 
this marriage and none are expected. 
6. At the time of their marriage, the Plaintiff 
(hereinafter called "Cheryl") was employed at a motel and 
restaurant in Moab, Utah and she also owned and operated a bar in 
Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had been 
purchased with Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented 
building. 
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• 7 . I !: I ,i .« s I i i I =! f I .1 l e r i i i i i ag^ CI ,c y i \ Ji 1 I ; L i i t e s t ed 
about "1 1 I III,11! i m : i: J S i I I E ($20,000.00) DOLLARS of her money in 
est.**: :D 
NINV ; u « « : . OLLARS :i currency ;^ .-i safety deposit box, the 
c . = - ' - ) 
DOLLARS J* ,i savings account a r: Williamsburg Bank, the sum ot ! ,:E 
THOUr .:; . - •. •;•>'- , 
the s:im of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS THIRTY CENTS ,;*",M5.30) 
; M 
THOUSAND FOUI .-.-.. FORTY--FIVE {$11 44 5.. 00) DOLLARS and a TEN 
r
 < 
8. The Defendant (hereinafter called '" -< .- brought no 
assets into the marriage ex..., . L .  L .: .:iu'..a .. - i 
his clothing. 
9. / e marriage, CI lery 1- s employer was 
providing meals, lodgino and health insurance fox her as a benefit 
of her employment. *J.L^- ^-3 marriage those benefits continued and 
were also extended ' .. --<* ^  benefit of Cheryl's employment 
3 0 - ^^'„ww ^oivjre _he marriage J lii i! terminated 
his minimum -• - -' ^mnl oyment- a** .=> custodian for another motel and 
began work-:*y - , . „ ~™. ...at pv... .orward, J W :; forked 
regularly in the bar, except for three {J) *nonths when he attempted 
to start a business for himself, He continued to work *r. the bar 
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until the parties separated in November of 1993. Cheryl managed and 
also worked in the bar during the same period of time. 
11. In late 1990, Cheryl became aware that the motel and 
restaurant where she worked were scheduled to be torn down. 
Construction of a new motel would require the use of the space 
where she had been operating the bar. She, therefore, began looking 
for another location. 
12. On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to purchase a 
lot building from her uncle for TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND ($23,000.00) 
DOLLARS down and the balance of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) 
DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum 
over ten (10) years. J.W. was a party to the contract but furnished 
none of the down payment. The down payment came from the pre-
marital and inherited property of Cheryl. (Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN 
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from her father's 
estate in 1988 and THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN ($3,316.00) 
DOLLARS in cash plus a right to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE ($183.00) 
DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years from her mother's estate in 
1991.) On the same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option 
to purchase the adjacent lot for TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS. 
Said option was to be exercised within one (1) year. 
13. Cheryl then began to remodel and improve the 
existing building to create a place to operate her bar. All of the 
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remodeling funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or inherited 
property. 
14. Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon in 1988. 
She was its sole shareholder and, in exchange for the shares, she 
had conveyed all of the property and assets of the original Outlaw 
Saloon into said corporation. Throughout the marriage, she has 
remained the sole owner of all of the shares of said corporation. 
15. Cheryl loaned the remodeling funds to the 
corporation from her sole and separate property. Cheryl claims to 
have loaned a total of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) DOLLARS to 
the corporation for the remodeling. However, the 1991 corporate tax 
returns list stockholder loans to the corporation of only TWENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00) DOLLARS as of the end of 
1991. Cheryl has presented no other documentation of that 
investment. Cheryl has shown that she sold her motel stock in 1991, 
presumably to finance the remodeling effort. At the time of its 
sale, the motel stock was worth FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($15,000.00) 
DOLLARS. 
16. J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns for 1987 
through 1992 and Cheryl filed corporate tax returns from 1989 
through 1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole proprietor 
of the bar before its incorporation and the sole owner of the 
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is the only shareholder in 
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the corporation although J.W. served as a director and a nominal 
secretary. 
17. The Outlaw Saloon ceased operation at its original 
location in August of 1991 and the new bar opened in October of 
1991. 
18. The new bar included living quarters for Cheryl and 
J.W. During the course of the marriage, J.W.'s meals, lodging, 
insurance and transportation needs were provided as a condition of 
Cheryl's employment or in conjunction with the operation of the 
business. J.W. received no separate compensation until 1989 for his 
work in the business. 
19. On October 2, 1991, when the option to purchase the 
adjacent lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the 
option and contacted her uncle for that purpose. Her uncle rejected 
her tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put 
their money into a home. The record reflects no further effort to 
acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993 when Cheryl's 
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade 
him "to go through with the sale. That effort failed and Cheryl 
decided to abandon the effort. A portion of the Saloon building 
actually sits on the adjacent lot and a significant portion of the 
parking lot is located on part of said parcel. Cheryl presently 
pays her uncle ONE HUNDRED ($100.00) DOLLARS per month for the 
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right to occupy said property but has no written agreement with 
him. 
20. After their separation in November, 1993, the 
parties entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the 
living quarters therein. At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed 
and was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W. 
21. On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed an 
agreement. That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the 
business at SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and provided that 
J.W. would reimburse her for one-half of that amount or the sum of 
THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The agreement also divided 
responsibility for the operation of the bar, set salaries for 
Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means for preserving the marital 
union. J.W. did not make more than the first few payments under 
this agreement and did not sell his trailer and pay over the 
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained this breach as a natural 
consequence of the failure of the corporation to pay all of the 
salary provided by the agreement. 
22. The 1992 agreement is not useful as a legal document 
because it was breached by both parties. Agreements between the 
parties to a marriage are not usually binding on a divorce court. 
(Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah 
but only under conditions that this agreement made no effort to 
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meet.) The agreement is most helpful as an expression of the states 
of mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when the pre-divorce legal 
posturing had not yet begun. The agreement reflects a recognition 
by both parties that the bar has been a joint marital venture but 
that Cheryl alone had made a substantial financial investment in 
that venture. Based on this agreement and the circumstances 
outlined above, the Court finds that the bar is a marital asset but 
that equitable division will require that Cheryl receive more than 
one-half of this marital asset. 
23. Cheryl's evidence about the value of the Outlaw 
Saloon was not countered by evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert 
opined that the total value of the property is ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-
FIVE THOUSAND ($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts this value. 
Cheryl and J.W. still owe her uncle FORTY-THREE THOUSAND 
($43,000.00) DOLLARS for the property. 
24. Although either Cheryl or J.W. may initially have 
had a chance of legally compelling the uncle to consummate the sale 
of the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their 
failure to pursue their claim. The Court finds that their claim to 
the adjacent lot has little or no value. Because Cheryl has the 
best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for the adjacent 
lot, the Court finds that it is most appropriate that the business, 
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the real estate, the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be awarded 
to Cheryl. 
25. The Court finds that the net value of all of these 
assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND ($112,000.00) 
DOLLARS. Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS of 
her separate pre-marital or inherited property in the business as 
of March 1993. The Court finds that she is entitled to recover all 
of that investment. The Court must then determine an equitable 
distribution for the remaining value of the property. 
26. The usual presumption is that marital property 
should be divided equally after pre-marital contributions are 
returned; however, there are two (2) facts that suggest the need 
for a different division in this case: 
A. Cheryl is fifty-one (51) years old. J.W. is 
thirty-eight (38) years old. Cheryl has also suffered an injury to 
her leg that seriously limits her ability to work. She has a 
greater need for marital assets than does J.W. 
B. Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the 
value of the business and property is due to an overall increase in 
Moab property values and not to any efforts of either party to make 
the business a success. In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are 
not a "growth industry" in Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly 
because the land on which it sits has become more valuable due to 
economic changes in the area. 
27. The Court finds that one-fourth (1/4) of the 
increased equity or the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND ($13,000.00) 
DOLLARS should be awarded to J.W. as his equitable portion of the 
property. The remainder of the increased equity is awarded to 
Cheryl. 
28. J.W. concedes that there is no other marital asset, 
except the portion of Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the marriage. 
Cheryl contributed EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS 
to her IRA during the marriage and those contributions had 
accumulated interest at an average rate of six point five (6.5%) 
percent per annum for an average of four (4) years. The Court finds 
that the value of the marital portion of the IRA is ELEVEN THOUSAND 
($11,000.00) DOLLARS. One-half of this amount should be awarded to 
J.W. 
29. J.W.'s total property award (THIRTEEN THOUSAND 
($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the increased equity in the property and 
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS from the increased 
value of the IRA) is the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award shall bear interest at 
the rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from January 1, 1995. The 
Court finds that Cheryl does not have the capacity to readily 
10 
borrow said sum of money and, therefore, she will need to make 
payments on the property award. The Court finds that the sum of 
approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($250.00) DOLLARS per month would 
allow a payoff of the property settlement over a period of 
approximately eight (8) years. Said monthly payments shall commence 
on February 1, 1995. As long as the payments are current, no 
execution shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to a lien on the 
real estate under the bar in the amount of the property award until 
same has been fully paid, together with interest thereon. 
30. Neither party has requested alimony during the 
proceeding and the Court awards no alimony herein. 
31. Each party is ordered to bear his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
32. The Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of her 
Complaint by adequate evidence. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant. 
2. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and 
personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded 
as follows: 
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A. The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar 
together with all of its assets, and the building and property 
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of the 
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled 
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement 
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is 
located in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEG 6 R D N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT, 
N 243 FT, E 67 *a FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93. 
ACRES; 0.38 
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the 
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-
action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of 
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with 
respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of 
Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest 
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East 
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to 
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements 
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
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C. The Defendant is awarded a property settlement 
in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00) 
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per 
annum from January 1, 1995 until fully paid. Said property 
settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the 
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23) 
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every 
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said 
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has 
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the 
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the 
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay 
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and 
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current, 
no execution on the property settlement shall issue but the 
Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided 
for herein. 
D. The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account 
free and clear of all claims of the Defendant. 
E. Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital 
property free and clear of all claims of the other. 
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p^ Each party is awarded those items of marital 
personal property i n his or her possession as of the date of trial 
on January 3, 1995• 
3. Neither party is awarded any alimony. 
4 . EacJ1 party is ordered to pay his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
LYLE^R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
UKIbllMAL 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
A t t o r n e y D e f e n d a n t 
F i f t h S t r e e t P l a z a , S u i t e 1 
475 E a s t Main S t r e e t 
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T e l e p h o n e : (801) 637-0177 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED F r q i 7 tuyj 
BY. 
CLdrtK OF Tnc OUURT 
f* 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 1 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. ] 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Civil No. 9447-8 
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was 
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE PAPPAS 
WHITE. Defendant was personally present and accompanied by his 
attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and 
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully 
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant. 
2. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and 
personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded 
as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar 
together with all of its assets, and the building and property 
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of the 
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled 
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement 
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is 
located in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT, 
N 243 FT, E 67 h FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93. 
ACRES; 0.38 
Together with all improvements thereon and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the 
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-
action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of 
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with 
2 
respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of 
Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest 
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East 
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to 
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements 
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
C. The Defendant is awarded a property settlement 
in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00) 
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per 
annum from January 1, 1995 until fully paid. Said property 
settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the 
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23) 
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every 
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said 
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has 
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the 
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the 
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay 
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and 
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current, 
no execution on the property settlement shall issue but the 
Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided 
for herein. 
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D. The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account 
free and clear of all claims of the Defendant. 
E. Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital 
property free and clear of all claims of the other. 
F. Each party is awarded those items of marital 
personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial 
on January 3, 1995. 
3. Neither party is awarded any alimony. 
4. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
DATED this W* day of WAPi'^u ^ L , 1995. 
LYtE^R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
& CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
James C. Lewis #1943 
DIUMENTI & LEWIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL ANN MONDERS, : 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, : Civil No. 9447-8 
Judge Anderson 
Defendant. 
Comes now defendant, Kenneth Monders, by and through counsel of record, James C. 
Lewis, and hereby submits his objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted by plaintiff, Cheryl Monders. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT - OBJECTIONS 
1. In paragraph 6 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, and in the Court's 
Memorandum Decision dated January 5, 1995, it is stated that plaintiff "owned and operated a 
bar in Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon", and that "she [plaintiff] operated the bar in a rented 
building". Defendant objects to these statements of fact on the grounds that the evidence at trial 
was sufficient to establish that the Outlaw Saloon was owned and operated by both parties, and 
that defendant was the principal party involved in the on-site operation of the bar. (See court 
record). Further, although it is not disputed that the assets of the initial bar "were purchased with 
Cheryl's money", the findings make no mention of the contribution of time and effort by 
defendant, in ^ establishing and operating the bar, which is supported by the record. This 
paragraph should be revised to include a statement that "Defendant contributed his time and 
efforts in establishing and operating this bar, with no pay until 1989. 
2. Defendant objects to paragraph 10 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact, on the 
basis that the record does not support the statement that "Cheryl managed and also worked in the 
bar during the same period of time" as defendant. In fact, defendant submits that the record will 
show that plaintiff did not work in the bar until the establishment of the second bar at a different 
location. (See court record.) 
3. Defendant objects to paragraphs 12 and 13 of plaintiffs proposed findings, on the 
following grounds: 
(a) It is clear from the record that both parties contracted to purchase the lot from 
plaintiffs uncle. 
(b) Although the record reflects, as indicated by plaintiff, that defendant did not 
contribute any of the down payment on the property, it is equally clear that defendant made a 
substantial contribution in his time, at little or no pay, in establishing and operating the new bar. 
This paragraph should be expanded to indicate these contributions by defendant. 
(c) Paragraph 13 of plaintiffs proposed findings, is clearly inconsistent with the 
record, in that both parties "began to remodel and improve the existing building to create a place" 
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to operate the bar. Further, the bar was to be owned jointly, consistent with the method in which 
title to the property was to be held. 
4. Defendant objects to paragraph 14 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact. The 
record reflects that defendant was an officer and director of the Outlaw Saloon at the time of its 
incorporation, uand participated in its formation. The record also reflects that following its 
creation, plaintiff excluded defendant from participation in the corporation, and failed to observe 
required corporate formalities, by conducting all of the corporate business herself as the "sole 
shareholder". Plaintiffs intentional actions designed to exclude defendant from what otherwise 
would be a marital asset, does not support a finding that she was the only shareholder of the 
corporation. 
5. Defendant objects to paragraph 19 of plaintiffs proposed findings of fact. The 
record reflects that plaintiff was ready, willing and able to exercise the option agreement, and, 
based on a letter from her counsel, intended to pursue an action to enforce the terms of the option 
agreement. Further, the record reflects that neither plaintiff nor defendant were in default under 
this agreement. Moreover, the record reflects that plaintiff was aware that the Outlaw Saloon 
building encroached on the adjacent lot, at the time of the purchase of the property. Finally, the 
record reflects that plaintiff testified she no longer intends to pursue legal action to purchase the 
adjacent property. 
6. Defendant objects to the finding in paragraph 22 of plaintiffs proposed findings 
of fact, that an equitable division [of the bar] will require that Cheryl receive more than one-half 
of this marital asset. While defendant does not dispute that plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement 
of pre-marital assets contributed to the business, the record reflects that defendant has also made 
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a substantial contribution in time and effort to the business, and the marital property should be 
divided equally after such reimbursement to plaintiff. 
7. Defendant strenuously objects to paragraph 23 of plaintiffs proposed findings of 
fact, and, similarly, to the Court's ruling with respect to the value of the Outlaw Saloon, at the 
bottom of pagb 5 of its Memorandum Decision. Contrary to the assertions in these findings, 
there was no evidence presented regarding the value of the Outlaw Saloon as a going concern. 
Quite to the contrary, on cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Joe Kingsley, the plaintiffs 
real estate expert, made it clear that his opinions were limited to the value of the real property, 
of $155,000, and that he had no opinions regarding the value of the business. No other evidence 
was offered regarding the value of the business. 
Defendant offered no evidence regarding the value of the business for one simple reason -
plaintiff consistently represented up until the day of trial, that she intended to sell the business. 
It was only when cross-examined at trial that she, for the first time, contradicted representations 
previously made, and indicated that she did not intend to offer the business for sale. For 
example, in response to Interrogatory No. 23 of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories, 
defendant asks whether plaintiff is willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon and 
the real property on which it is located, and asks plaintiff to indicate the price at which she 
would be willing to sell such assets. In her responses, included as exhibits at trial, plaintiff 
responds: 
"Yes I am willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which I am 
100% stockholder and president together with the real property on which it is located of 
which I am joint tenant with the Defendant . . . " 
Similarly, in response to Interrogatory No. 19 of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories, in 
4 
which defendant asks plaintiff to describe her efforts to sell the business and real property, 
plaintiff states: 
"I have told a thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the 
completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and telephone numbers is too 
lengthy to list at this time. These efforts to sell to these various people are in an 
unofficial nature pending the finality of this action. " 
Plaintiff has consistently represented since the initiation of this action that it was her 
intention to sell the business, which representations were flatly contradicted for the first time at 
trial. Clearly, plaintiff was either engaging in a form of deception, by representing one thing in 
response to discovery and then contradicting such representations at trial, or intentionally 
violating her duty to supplement discovery pursuant to Rule 26(e)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, by failing to amend her prior response regarding her intention to sell the business. 
Because plaintiff made it clear in her responses to discovery that she intended to sell the 
business, defendant did not find it necessary or prudent to present evidence regarding the value 
of the business, as the logical ruling of the court would be to order a sale of the business and to 
equitably divide the proceeds therefrom. Defendant was seriously compromised by plaintiffs 
contradictory testimony and failure to supplement discovery as required. Further, the record will 
reflect that plaintiff failed to present any testimony regarding the value of the business (eg., the 
Court will recall that plaintiff was unable to respond to simple questions regarding the financial 
statements of the business). 
8. Defendant strenuously objects to paragraph 24 of plaintiffs proposed findings of 
fact. Defendant does not believe the record supports a finding that the "prospects of success [on 
the adjacent lot] have been dimmed by their failure to pursue their claim. Defendant further 
submits that the record supports a finding that (a) this lot has a value substantially in excess of 
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the option price, particularly if it is used in conjunction with the existing Outlaw Saloon business 
and property (as testified to by Joe Kingsley); and (b) that there is a probability of prevailing in 
an action against plaintiffs uncle. Further, defendant submits that it is inequitable to award this 
valuable claim to plaintiff without some award to defendant, particularly in view of plaintiffs 
testimony thafshe does not intend to pursue such claim against her uncle. 
9. Defendant objects to paragraph 25 of plaintiffs proposed findings, for the reasons 
enumerated above. 
10. Defendant objects to paragraph 26 of plaintiffs proposed findings, on the grounds 
that: (a) the record reflects that defendant made a substantial contribution to the pre-marital 
property; (b) the record reflects that plaintiff, unlike defendant, has other substantial assets, 
including pre-marital contributions to be returned to her; and (c) contrary to the proposed 
finding, there was no evidence adduced at trial regarding the value of the business, and its 
appreciation. 
11. Defendant objects to the division of equity set forth in paragraph 27 of the 
proposed findings, for the reasons enumerated above. 
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - OBJECTIONS 
12. Defendant objects to plaintiffs proposed conclusion of law number 2A, on the 
grounds that it is inequitable to award the real property and assets to plaintiff. The just and 
equitable result would be an order requiring the parties to put the business and real estate up for 
sale, and dividing the proceeds from sale equally, after reimbursement of pre-marital assets to 
plaintiff. Alternatively, a new trial or hearing should be held to determine the value of the 
business - an issue on which evidence was not presented at trial due to plaintiffs representations 
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up until the day of trial that she intended to sell the business. 
13. Defendant objects to plaintiffs proposed conclusion number 2B. The record 
reflects that the rights to the lot owned by plaintiffs uncle has substantially greater value than 
the option price. Defendant should be awarded the sole rights to the adjacent lot, due to 
plaintiffs testimony that she does not intend to pursue this claim. Alternatively, the value of this 
claim should be taken into account in dividing the marital assets. 
14. Defendant objects to proposed conclusion number 2C for the reasons enumerated 
above. 
DATED this7_t>_ day of February, 1995. 
1 & LEWIS 
lames C. Lejvfs 
Attoniey-^or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this M^day of February, 1995, 
to: Joane Pappas White, 475 East Main, #1, Price, Utah 84501. 
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PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS 
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT 
REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF 
N O V - 3 0 - 9 4 
15.02 FROM: JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. ID« O01G3701B3 RAGE jil 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HONDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS 
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT 
REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27. For each of the 
Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery which you 
deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such denial, and 
identify and documents or witnesses who provide support for such 
denial. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27, The Plaintiff 
used the following facts as basis for denial of the original 
Requests for Admission: 
1. Admission No. 1. Plaintiff denied Admission No. 1 
because the construction of the Outlaw Saloon was started in June 
„„
 a 4 15=02 FROM JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. ID: 801G3701B3 PAGE 2 
1987 and the business opened under the direction and control of the 
Plaintiff on November 8, 1986• During the construction and opening 
of the Outlaw Saloon, the Defendant was merely one (1) of a number 
of boyfriends of which the Plaintiff had and had no business 
interest whatsoever. The Parties subsequently go married in 1987 
and, after numerous attempts to get the Defendant to participate 
in the business in some meaningful way, including the entry of an 
agreement in which the Defendant agreed to pay one-half (h) of 
Plaintiff's original investment, which he never did, the plaintiff 
gave up trying to include the Defendant in the business. The beer 
license was issued in the sole name of Cheryl Monders on August 22, 
1986; Cheryl Monders is the sole owner of all stock of the 
corporation which owns and operates the outlaw Saloon and provided 
all funds for the original acquisition of the property prior to the 
date of the marriage. Additionally, she has provided substantial 
amounts -of premarital money into the operation of the Saloon 
following the date of marriage but did so with the express 
understanding that she was the sole owner of the business and the 
sole owner of the corporation which was expressly set up by her 
then legal counsel to assure sole ownership of her investment-
2. Admission No. 2* Plaintiff denied Admission No. 2 
because the parties never entered into a contract for the 
establishment of the business. The parties entered into a contract 
in 1992, some six (6) years after the establishment of the Outlaw 
Saloon wherein Mr, Monders agreed to pay THIRTY THOUSAND 
($30,000.00) DOLLARS plus interest to the Plaintiff in order to 
acquire a partial interest in the Outlaw Saloon. The Defendant 
N O V - r 3 
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refused, failed and neglected to ever perform the terms of said 
contract. 
3. Admission No. 3. Cheryl Monders has previously 
admitted that she had an oral agreement with Marvin c. Tangren for 
the purchase of real property adjoining the Outlaw Saloon and that 
he refused to honor said commitment. She further admitted that she 
had one legal opinion which was rendered approximately three and 
one-half to four (3 h to 4) years ago wherein the legal opinion 
indicated that it was more likely than not that the contract might 
be enforceable but the expenses associated with the lawsuit would 
run between TEN and FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($10,000 and $15,000) DOLLARS-
Since the expenses of such suit exceeded the value which the 
Plaintiff had agreed to pay for the property, the Plaintiff took 
no further efforts. As a result, Plaintiff now believes that a 
Statute of Limitations may have run with respect to the 
enforceability of any alleged oral agreement. 
4. Admission No. 4, Plaintiff denied Admission No. 4 
because she has no intention of pursuing legal action to enable her 
to exercise the option agreement. 
5. Admission No. 5. Plaintiff denied Admission No. 5 
because it contains several inaccuracies. Although Plaintiff was 
a party to an Option Agreement (which has been stolen along with 
the corporate and personal papers and, therefore is not available 
for Plaintiff's reinspection)* Said Option Agreement expired and 
no longer exists and, therefore the Plaintiff is not a party to the 
agreement. To the best of Plaintiff's information and belief, the 
Option Agreement was entered in October of 1990, 
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6. Admission No. 7. Plaintiff denied Admission No. 7 
for the express reasons outlined in her original Answers to 
Admission No. 7. 
1. Admission No. 8. Plaintiff denied Admission No. 8 
for the express reasons outlined in her original Answers to 
Admission No. 8-
8. Admission No. 9. Plaintiff denied Admission No. 9 
for the express reasons outlined in her original Answers to 
Admission No. 9, 
REQUEST NO. 8. Please provide copies of 
any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 8, We intend to utilize 
potentially any documents that have been produced during discovery, 
any corporate records, any of the documents which evidence the 
original loan agreements between Cheryl Monders and the 
corporation, the original agreement by the Defendant to purchase 
an interest in the Saloon, a Financial Statement showing the 
Plaintiff's current income and expenses which is in conformity with 
the income and expense materials contained the Answers to 
Interrogatories and an outline of her proposed distribution which 
is nothing more than a summary of the testimony she will provide 
from the witness stand with respect to her desires for allocation 
of assets. (The final document has not yet been prepared but is 
merely illustrative of her testimony and does not contain 
independent information and is primarily lawyer work product to 
assist in the presentation of the testimony). 
N O V -30-94 15:03 FROM= JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. ID: 801B3701B3 FAGESS25 
DATED thisn/T day of November, 1994. 
0it 
f r.TTY^rm-i PAPPAS1'WHITE
orney at Law 
N O V -30-94 1B:03 FROM: 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. ID * 801G370183 PAGE 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3 445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Vs. ] 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
i CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
1 Civil No. 9447-8 
) 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of Plaintiff's supplemental Response to Defendant's Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, postage 
prepaid, posted at Price, Utah on the <5lL_day of November, 1994, 
to the following: 
James C. Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
505 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
DATED this =4 L^t— day of November, 1994. 
for Plaintiff 
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MOV-30-34 15:04 FROM: JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing Certificate of Service, 
postage prepaid, this >\tih day of November, 1994 to the 
following: 
James C, Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
505 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 9447-8 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Requests for Admissions 
as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
ADMISSION NO. 1 Admit that you are unwilling 
to sell the business known as "The Outlaw Saloon", including all 
of the personal property used in said business, together with the 
real estate on which the business is located, and your rights to 
the option agreement, for the total sum of $150,000, payable in 
cash within sixty (60) days of signing an earnest money agreement. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 1 Denies Admission No. 1. 
The Plaintiff would be willing to sell the business known as the 
Outlaw Saloon for the sum of ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND 
($150,000) DOLLARS in cash payable within sixty (60) days of the 
N O 
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signing of the earnest money agreement provided that the person 
purchasing the property is willing to assume all title defects 
associated with the property and further assuming that the 
Plaintiff will not be required to pay any real estate commissions 
costs of sale beyond title insurance and recording fees and will 
have to pay no costs for purposes of clearing title to any portion 
of this sale property* 
ADMISSION NO, 2 Admit that you are unwilling 
to sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the 
total sum of $175,000, on the same terms as described in Request 
No. 1, above• 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 2 Plaintiff denies Admission 
No. 2 and alleges that Plaintiff is willing to sell the property 
for the sum of ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($175,000) 
DOLLARS in cash providing that costs of clearing title on the 
existing^ property does not exceed FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($15f000) 
DOLLARS and further providing that costs and terms of sale are as 
outlined above, 
ADMISSION NO. 3 Admit that you are unwilling 
to sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the 
total sum of $200,000, on the same terms as described in Request 
No. 1, above• 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 3 Denies Admission No. 3. 
Plaintiff would be willing to sell the property, assume all costs 
associated with clearing title, assume all costs of sale and even 
2 
„~r~ nuTTr pen ID: 801G370183 PAGE •£© 
NOV-30-94 15:05 FROM: JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. lu o 
assume a real estate commission in the event she was able to obtain 
a cash offer under the terms outlined in Admission No. 3, 
ADDENDUM TO ADMISSIONS NQ 1, 2, 3 
Plaintiffs statements concerning clearing title do not 
include any expenses associated with acquiring the property from 
Mr* Tangren but merely involves clearing title as it affects 
boundary lines of the existing buildings of the Outlaw Saloon. 
DATED this J%9^^av of November, 1994, 
jTUrtJjAA 
IERYL MONDERS, CH  , P l a i n t i f f 
k/C\t.l\lWlS Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s //L?EH'l day of 
nQotobar, 1994. 
NC 
My Commission Expires: 
%LL mi^ 
ommission Expires: Residing At: i s id ing At: 
EATED t h i O ^ — - d aY of^rtefaar; 1994. 
'JAVWHITE^ 
ey for Plaintiff 
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, | 
Vs. , 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i Civil No. 9447-8 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Request for 
Admission, postage prepaid, posted at Price, Utah on the 
day of November, 1994, to the following: 
James C. Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
505 south Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 A 
DATED this^XZ— day of November, 1994. 
a,v^  u 
JOANE-tfAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOV-30 -34 15=05 FROM: JOANE PAPPAS WHITE ESQ. ID: 801G3701B3 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and^ooegoing Certificate of Service, 
postage prepaid, this 'Onv\ day of November, 1994 to the 
following: 
James C. Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
505 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
i 
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PLAINTIFFS ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT REQUESTS 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Vs. ; 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO 
) DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
) INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT 
) REQUESTS 
Civil No. 9447-8 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 
34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 Describe in detail 
all compensation you have received from the business known as 
The Outlaw Saloon during the calendar year 1994. (In 
responding to this interrogatory, Plaintiff should include all 
direct and indirect compensation, including personal payments 
made on Plaintiff's behalf by the business). 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: With the exception 
of February 1994, I was injured and not able to be here. 
Housing is provided by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., for a night 
\? 
watchman. I elected to be here so as to not hire outside 
help. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 Indicate all of the 
periods during the calendar year 1994 during which you were 
unable to work due to the injury to your knee cap. Also 
indicate all of the periods in 1994 during which you have 
worked as a manager or a bartender of the Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: I was and still am 
the owner and manager of the Outlaw Saloon Inc., since its 
inception in 1986 to date. I was off work and still am as a 
bartender from January 12, 1994 and to date have not been 
released. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 Please indicate 
whether or not your doctors have released you to work, and, 
if so, indicate the date of such release, and whether you are 
willing to produce a copy of said release. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: I have not been 
released back to work. As of October 4, 1994 my case was 
closed by Dr. Patterson. I am not signing any release until 
I try bartending which will be the end of November 1994. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 Describe all workers 
compensation benefits you have received as a result of your 
injury during the 1994 calendar year, and, in that regard, 
indicate the following: 
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(a) the monthly payments received by you; the date 
such payments commenced; and the date such payments 
terminated, if applicable; 
(b) the name of the workers compensation fund 
paying such benefits. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: 
(a) $167.00 per week; January 13, 1994 through 
March 24, 1994. See attached Compensation Agreement. 
(b) Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5 Indicate whether or 
not any of the assets contained in your safety deposit box at 
First Security Bank of Utah, Moab, Utah, 84532, #470, as 
identified in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 14 
of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, were acquired 
during the course of the marriage. If so, identify what 
assets were acquired during the marriage. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: A title to the 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part 
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for 
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann, 
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 Identify with 
specificity the "miscellaneous items11 identified in 
subparagraph (a) in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 
14 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. 
3 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: A title to the 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part 
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for 
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann, 
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7 Indicate all of the 
dates you have lived in the apartment unit located on the real 
property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, since the 
separation of the parties. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: I did live in the 
caretakers apartment alone starting November 9, 1993 until 
January 14, 1994. I was then thrown out of my bar and house 
on a fraudulent ex-parte order and did not get back into the 
apartment until March 15, 1994. I have been there ever since. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8 Indicate whether you 
have personally paid for each and every personal expense 
identified in response to Interrogatory Number 16 of 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, or whether some or 
any of those expenses have been paid by the Outlaw Saloon. 
If the Outlaw Saloon has paid some of such expenses, please 
identify which expenses it has paid. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: R e n t w a s 
furnished by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., in the caretaker's 
apartment, but if I chose not to stay another party would have 
been paid. Lights, water and laundry facilities are included 
in the apartment for the service of caretaking. All other 
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expenses are paid for personally. The Plaintiff is still 
paying for the Defendant's medical insurance. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9 Indicate the original 
purchase price of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe and Motel 
identified by Plaintiff in response to Interrogatory Number 
25 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9 In June of 1986, 
ten (10) months prior to my marriage, I purchased shares in 
the Canyonlands Motel and Cafe Inc. This stock was owned by 
me prior to my marriage and was sold for FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
($15,000.00) DOLLARS and was deposited into the Outlaw Saloon 
Inc. , checking account for the purpose of building the present 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., #2. The original purchase price was TEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($10,545.00) DOLLARS which 
has already been answered in the first set of Interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 10 Indicate the source 
of funds for the purchase of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe 
and Motel. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10 The stock was 
purchased prior to my marriage. Plaintiff objects to 
providing information on the source of the funds as the shares 
were premarital. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Please describe what 
you mean by your response of "recalled 1988-approx." in 
response to Interrogatory Number 25 of Defendants's First Set 
of Interrogatories. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11 This was a tax 
free Missouri Authority Bond bought in 1982. Five (5) years 
prior to my marriage. It was recalled in 1988 and the TEN 
THOUSAND ($10,000) DOLLARS received was then placed in my 
checking account. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12 Please indicate 
whether you are willing to provide a copy of the financial 
statement or statements referred to in response to 
Interrogatory Number 28 of Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, located at Nate Knight Accounting, or whether 
Defendant will be required to incur the cost and inconvenience 
of subpoenaing such records. Please indicate the same with 
respect to the financial statement or statements located at 
the office of Clara Wilburg. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 Y e s , s e e 
attached. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13 Please describe in 
detail the "many heirlooms11 you claim Defendant possesses in 
response to Interrogatory Number 3 0 of Defendant's Fires Set 
of Interrogatories 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13 A patchwork quilt 
from my mother around 19 62. It was hand made and my 
grandmother helped make it. Both are now deceased. Value 
priceless, ($10,000.00); Rocker high back spindle (era 1898) 
irreplaceable, value unknown priceless. ($700.00) given to 
me by my mother twenty (26) years ago in 1967; High back 
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straight chair, value unknown ($500.00), acquired in 1980 gift 
from my mother; and one (1) pair of diamond earrings, a 
birthday gift to me from my mother in 1985, small gold rose 
bud with a diamond center, valued at ($550.00). 
INTERROGATORY NO, 14 Please provide the 
specific information requested in subparagraphs (a-e) to 
Interrogatory Number 3 6 of Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, which information was omitted in Plaintiff's 
first response to said Interrogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14 Please see Financial 
Summary attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15 Please indicate to 
whom you reported that assets were stolen, as indicated in 
subparagraph 12 of plaintiff's response to Interrogatories 
Numbers 36 and 37 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15 Moab City Police 
Department, Steve Ross, February 26, 1994. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16 Indicate whether or 
not there were any other individuals, in addition to the 
individuals identified in plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory 
Number 3 8 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, who may 
testify at the trial of this action, and indicate the matters 
upon which it is anticipated such individual(s) may testify. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16 Plaintiff Cheryl 
Monders will testify on all issues raised by her Complaint; 
Sharon Sellers, employee of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., who will 
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testify concerning the operation of the Saloon and J.W. 
violence towards Cheryl; Debra Edwards, employee of the Outlaw 
Saloon, Inc., who will testify concerning the operation of the 
Saloon and J.W. violence towards Cheryl; Joe Kingsley who will 
testify with respect to the market value of the Outlaw Saloon; 
Mary Lou Shupe, Abuse; Dennis Nielson, abuse; Dennis Wilberg, 
Abuse; Mike Gillispie, abuse; Dan Black, Outlaw Saloon Inc, 
#1 and #2; Don Covey, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; 
Jeane Couchman, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; Maria 
Fergurson, Outlaw Saloon, Inc. #1 and #2; Willie Tucker, 
Canyonlands Motel, Outlaw Saloon #1 and abuse. 
JOANE REVIEW 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17 Indicate whether you 
are willing to obtain a copy of your payroll records which 
show your earnings from January 1, 1994 to the present from 
Smuin, Rich and Marsing, as identified in answer to 
Defendant's request number 1 of Defendant's First Request for 
Production of Documents. Alternatively, indicate whether you 
are willing to sign a release or consent, authorizing the 
release of such records to Defendant. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17 See attached 
Employer's Quarterly Wage List. Yes, I am willing to sign a 
consent to release such records. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18 Indicate whether 
your personal tax returns and tax returns for the business for 
the Outlaw Saloon, for the calendar year 1993, have been 
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completed. If so, indicate whether you will provide a copy 
of said tax returns. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO, 18 Yes, they were 
completed and sent in. Yes I will provide a copy. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 19 Describe in detail 
all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on your behalf, to 
sell, or offer for sale, the business known as the Outlaw 
Saloon, and the real property on which the Outlaw Saloon is 
located. In responding to this Interrogatory, please identify 
all individuals with whom contact has been made regarding a 
prospective sale to the business, including the names and 
addresses of prospective buyers, the names and addresses of 
real estate brokers or agents involved in such prospective 
sale, and any other individuals who may have been involved in 
any such prospective transaction. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19 I have told a 
thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the 
completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and 
telephone numbers is too lengthy to list at this time. These 
efforts to sell to these various people are in an unofficial 
nature pending the finality of this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20 Please identify any 
appraisals, property evaluations or reevaluations conducted 
on the real property and the business known as the Outlaw 
Saloon. In responding to such Interrogatory, indicate the 
name, address and telephone number of any person or firm who 
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was involved in such appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation, 
and indicate what information was provided to any such party 
by you or anyone on your behalf to enable such party to 
complete their appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation* 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO-20 B o b M u i r 
estimated value based on structure, size, type, age and the 
quality of the construction. The value was between ONE 
HUNDRED FIFTY to ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($150,000.00 to $160,000.00) - Closed door business. The 
business was worth six (6%) percent of one (1) years profit. 
He is now deceased. Grand County Assessors Office. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21 Indicate the source 
of the deposit of $37,912.35 into your Golden Passbook Savings 
Account, #18378423, on September 19, 1990. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21 See Financial 
Summary attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22 Indicate where the 
funds from the withdrawal on October 2, 1990 in the amount of 
$2 3,000.00', from the account referred to in the above 
paragraph, were transferred. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22 T h e y w e r e 
transferred to M. C. Tangren for a down payment on the 
property, quonset hut, building and lot. See attached 
document for production #9. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Indicate whether you 
are willing to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon, 
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together with the real property on which it is located, and 
all of your rights to purchase the adjacent lot #95, pursuant 
to an option agreement with your uncle. If the answer to this 
Interrogatory is "yes," indicate the price at which you would 
be willing to sell these properties and assets. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Yes, I am willing 
to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which 
I am 100% stockholder and president together with the real 
property on which it is located of which I am a joint tenant 
with the Defendant whom has not contributed any monies for the 
purpose of said lot. No I cannot sell something I do not have 
on the adjacent lot #95. I do not have an option. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24 Indicate whether you 
would be willing to split with defendant the cost of an 
appraisal tot the business and real property on which the 
Outlaw Saloon is located, if such appraisal can be completed 
prior to the trial date. In responding to this Interrogatory, 
indicate all conditions you and your counsel would require to 
such an arrangement. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24 NO. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25 Indicate if you are 
willing to have a real estate expert engaged by Defendant, 
inspect the premises, and receives all of the pertinent books 
and records of the Outlaw Saloon. If so, indicate what, if 
any, books and records of the business you are not willing to 
allow such person to review. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25 No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 6 Please describe in 
detail all monies you claim are owed to you by the Outlaw 
Saloon, or Defendant. In responding to such Interrogatory, 
describe the date(s) such monies were advanced by you to the 
Outlaw Saloon or Defendant, the source of such monies, and any 
documentation, instruments, or papers evidencing such 
obligation or transfer of monies. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26 E I G H T Y - N I N E 
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE ($89,193.00) DOLLARS plus 
interest. Amount of money documented. No return on this 
money has been made. This money was put up by the Plaintiff 
as the financier of the Outlaw Saloon #1 and #2. These monies 
would have earned the Plaintiff THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND 
($35,000.00) DOLLARS in the period of time had this money been 
placed in other endeavors. See financial Summary attached 
hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27 For each of the 
Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery 
which you deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such 
denial, and identify any documents or witnesses who provide 
support for such denial. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27 These will be 
supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28 Describe in detail 
all outstanding indebtedness or obligations of the Outlaw 
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Saloon, including date the indebtedness or obligation was 
incurred, name and address of the creditor, amount of 
indebtedness outstanding, and payment terms. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28 Cheryl Monders, 
indebtedness, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
NINETY-THREE ($124,193.00) DOLLARS. M.C. Tangren, FORTY 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE DOLLARS AND SIXTY-NINE 
($40,483.69) CENTS, monthly payment SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX 
DOLLARS AND TWENTY-SIX ($456.26) CENTS, payment on terms on 
Cheryl ten (10%) percent interest increasing compounded. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29 Identify any 
individual or firm which you have engaged, or which you 
anticipate engaging, to testify at trial regarding the value 
of the business known as the Outlaw Saloon, the real property 
on which it is located, and/or lot 95. In responding to this 
Interrogatory, describe in detail the matters on which it is 
anticipated such individual(s) or firm(s) will testify, and 
describe in detail all documents, papers, materials, and other 
information that has been provided or which it is anticipated 
will be provided, to such individual(s) or firm(s), to enable 
such party or parties to perform such work. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29 Joe Kingsley 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 Please provide 
copies of the bank statements for the Outlaw Saloon, covering 
the period beginning from the date of inception of the 
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business through September 30, 1994. (These documents were 
previously requested in Defendant's First Set of Discovery, 
but bank statements covering only Plaintiff's personal 
accounts were produced in response to this request. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 B a n k 
statements from 1986, 1988 - 1989 are missing. 1991 to 
present are sketchy. See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2 Please provide 
a copy of the cash register receipts from the Outlaw Saloon, 
for each day from January 1, through September 30, 1994. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff can make these receipts available for 
inspection at a mutually convenient time, and indicate when 
such documents may be available. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2 C a S h 
register receipts can be made available to Defendant's counsel 
at the Outlaw Saloon. Please advise which day would be 
convenient through Plaintiff's counsel. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 Please provide 
a copy of any contracts, correspondence or documents 
pertaining to any remodeling, improvements, refurbishing or 
other construction performed on the real property and business 
known as the Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 Construction 
has not started. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4 Please provide 
any documentation, papers and writings which support your 
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claim that you contributed pre-marital monies or assets to the 
business known as the Outlaw Saloon and the real property on 
which it sits. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4 See attached 
Financial Summary. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 5 Please provide 
monthly personal bank statements for any and all checking or 
other accounts which would show your personal expenditures 
during the calendar year 1994. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5 Previously 
submitted in First Set of Answers to Interrogatories. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6 Please provide 
copies of any contracts, correspondence, and other documents 
pertaining to the option agreement with Marvin Tangren, and 
the real property owned by Marvin C Tangren, located adjacent 
to the property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, 
commonly known as Lot 95. Such response should include any 
correspondence between your counsel and Mr. Tangren, and from 
Mr. Tangren to you or your counsel. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6 These items 
were stolen. I reported them to Moab City Police on February 
26, 1994. See police report on production no. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7 Please provide 
copies of all corporate documents of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., 
including articles of incorporation and bylaws, as amended; 
minutes of meetings of, or action taken by, the board of 
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directors, officers, and shareholders, and contracts between 
the corporation and any third parties. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7 See attached 
hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8 Please provide 
copies of any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8 I will 
supplement. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9 Please provide 
copies of any documents or writings which reflect any 
outstanding indebtedness or obligation of The Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9 See attached 
hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10 Please provide 
copies of all paystubs or other documentation which evidences 
any compensation, direct or indirect, received by you from The 
Outlaw Saloon during 1994. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10 Attached 
hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11 Please provide 
copies of all financial statements of The Outlaw Saloon 
prepared by Nate Knight Accounting, Clara Wilburg, or any 
other person or firm on behalf of you or The Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11 See attached 
hereto. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 12 Please provide 
a copy of any reports of stolen assets, as described in 
Interrogatory Number 15. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12 S e e 
attached hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13 Please provide 
copies of any tax returns, annual or quarterly, for 1993 and 
1994, filed for either you personally or The Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13 S e e 
attached hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14 Please provide 
a copy of any appraisal, evaluation or assessment of the 
business of The Outlaw Saloon, and/or the real property on 
which it is located, and Lot 95. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14 T h e 
appraisal from Bob Muir was asked for. Sizes, facts and 
business figures were brought up but it was never completed. 
He passed away. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 Please provide 
a copy of any other documents identified in response to the 
Interrogatories set forth. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 Attached 
hereto. 
DATED this •%H\*y of November, 1994. 
'~~JOMJE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Carbon ) 
CHERYL MONDERS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states that she is the Defendant in the above-entitled action; 
that she has read the above and foregoing and knows the 
contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the 
best of her knowledge, except as to those matters therein 
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters 
believes the same to be true. 
ERYL MONDE: 
"fttSrtU ^ 
CH NDERS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this'" J__J__' day of 
November, 1994. 
P _ _ . ^ 
r ' ^ X Notary Public I / ^ , 
* \ SHELUA.ATVVCOD I Air.-7 /( // I . .. f 
! * f-5 So. West Temple 34C31 / >/•• ./,/,( / ( / CttT f '/ 
» , I/./CcfTnTissionExci^ s 1 /JOTARY PUBLIC 
{
 V - - ^ Y March 23.1395 ] / ^ 
*Re&*&i**g-«Ate'>-~ — — — — ~ Ji j - - , / / / / / 
My Commission Expires: /' {/Li '£( \ -^^/ ^<S 
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diction when defendant conveyed during pen- pendente lite, resulting in series of endless 
dency of action; Subdivision (c) continues liti- suits. Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 
gation with same litigants to determinative 538 (1953). 
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur . 2d Parties new action within specified time after failure 
$S 225 et seq., 231 to 233. of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848. 
C.J .S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 58 et seq. Cause of death, official death certificate as 
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attor- evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21 
ney to confess judgment against assignee, A.L.R.3d 418. 
guarantor, or other party obligating himself Attorney's death prior to final adjudication 
for performance of primary contract, 5
 0 r settlement of case as affecting compensation 
A.L.R.3d 426.
 u n d e r contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d 
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of 1375 
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or
 V a l i d i t i n c o n t r a c t for i n s t a l l m e n t s a i e 0f 
next friend to sue for granting or vacation of, , . . 
, • 1*1 * • u consumer goods, or commercial paper given in 
or to make a compromise or settlement in such . b . . , _ . / r °. 
„ •* a A T r> OJ £oi connection therewith, of provision waiving, as 
suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
 x . c , „ 
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit against assignee defenses good against seller, 
against debt of depositor not due at time of his 39 A.L.R.3d 0I8. 
death 7 A L R 3d 908 Conservator or guardian for an incompetent. 
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or priority and preference in appointment of, 65 
legal obligation contemporaneously or subse- A.L.R.3d 991. 
quently incurred shall be canceled by death of Defamation action as surviving plaintifTs 
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R.3d 1427. death, under statute not specifically covering 
Applicability, as affected by change in par- action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272. 
ties, of statute permitting commencement of Key Numbers. — Parties e= 59. 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
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able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive, (n) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought, or 
(in) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion The court may act upon its own initiative aftei reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c) 
(2) I n s u r a n c e ag reemen t s . A partv mav obtain discovery of the exis-
tence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reim-
burse for payments made to satisfy the judgment Information concerning 
the insurance agreement is not bv reason of disclosure admissible in 
evidence at trial For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insur-
ance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement 
(3) Trial p r epa ra t i on : Mater ia ls . Subject to the piovisions of Subdivi-
sion (b)(4) of this rule, a party ma\ obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means 
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concern-
ing the action or its subject matter prev lously made by that party Upon 
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person If the request is refused, the person may move for a court 
order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is 
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded 
(4) Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Sub-
division (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows* 
(A) (I) A party may through interrogatories require any other 
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to 
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance 
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify 
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion 
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(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by 
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such 
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an ex-
pert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not ex-
pected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) 
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
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otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
( D a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the mo(;on. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered 
or amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference 
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
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sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
his address The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation If a request, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to 
it until it is signed 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
tion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, oi 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount 
of the reasonable expenses mcuned because of the violation, including a lea-
sonable attorney fee 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
action or pioceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations as if such action or proceeding weie pending in this state, provided 
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided furthei 
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the 
lules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Compi ler ' s Notes —Thi& lule corresponds Expert and other opinion testimonv Rules 
to Rule 26 F R C P 701 to 706 U R E 
Cross-References — Admis<;ibilitv ofevi Liability insurance, admissibility of Rule 
dence, ^ 78 21 3 Rule 43(a)
 4 1 1 ^ R E 
Continuance to permit disco\er\ Rule o6if) »* * J U J * r> i 
n 4. i n T Motions e\idence on by depositions Rule Depositions upon oral examination Rule J v 
30(c) 43(b) 
Depositions use in court proceedings Rule Privileges <rt 78-24 8 78-24-9, Rule 501 et 
32 seq I R E 
Depositions when taken Rule 30(a) Summary judgment, discoveiy supporting or 
Discover proceduies Rule 4 502 Rules of opposing motion for Rule 56(e) 
Judicial Administration Terminate or limit examination, motion to 
Exclusion of deposition from evidence Rule Rule 30(d) 
32(b) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Trade secrets 
—Waiver 
Applicability of rule Purpose of rule 
Privilege against self-incrimination Scope of discovery 
Protective order j n general 
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their authenticity, to accept a copy of defen-
dant's written admissions served upon plaintiff 
as compliance with the rules; where the trial 
court chose the latter option, it was proper to 
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admis-
sions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v. 
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). 
—Failure to respond. 
Objectionable matter. 
Even if a request for an admission is objec-
tionable, if a party fails to object and fails to 
respond to the request, then that party should 
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 
1985). 
Prison inmate. 
When inmate served requests for admissions 
and interrogatories on prison officials in action 
for recovery of value of personal property taken 
from him, on failure of officials to respond to 
the requests, apply for extension of time, or 
move to amend or withdraw their admissions 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were 
deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled 
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Motion to dismiss. 
Tolling. 
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect 
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for ad-
missions which are not answered within 45 
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for 
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Punitive damages. 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu-
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to ac-
tual damages, the court, as a matter of equity, 
must intervene and examine the admission. 
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151, 
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes-
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis-
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
rules, to respond to request for admission of 
facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
A.L.R.3d 756. 
Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
admissions under state discovery rules. 8 
A.L.R.4th 728. 
Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery <£=> 121 to 129. 
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner, 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
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(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspect ion. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a wrritten 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. § 78-32-1 et seq. 
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